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Rising out of the mists of waiver and estoppel are certain clearly seen
prominences which seem to mark the limits of obscurity. At one end is
the oft-repeated touchstone, waiver and estoppel cannot be used to extend
the scope of the policy, and at the other extreme is the equally well-worn
phrase, the law frowns on forfeitures and leans toward waiver whenever
the facts justify it. In between, the fog is thick and the words "waiver"
and "estoppel" are applied, frequently without discrimination, to achieve
results which seem to be just in the particular case.
The purpose of this article is to test the reality of these boundaries,
to see if the landmarks arc what they seem, and to consider underlying fact
situations in an effort to determine if there is not a more valid limitation
on the area of waiver and estoppel than the apparently logical catch-phrases
set forth above.
The courts have always used a limitation based upon the nature of
the right. They have declared that a mere forfeiture or breach of condition
inserted in the policy for the benefit of the insurer may be a proper subject
of waiver or estoppel,1 but that a right affecting the scope of the policy
cannot be, because to allow waiver or estoppel of such a right would
result in the creation of a new contract; 2 and new contracts require
consideration. It is submitted that this limitation is the cause of much of
the confusion that now exists. In its place we propose a limitation based,
not upon the nature of the right, but upon the relationship of the time
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1. State Life Ins. Co. v. Finney, 216 Ala. 562, 114 So. 132 (1927); Milton
Ice Company, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 320 Mass. 719, 71 N.E.2d 232 (1947);
Saucier v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 181 Miss. 887, 179 So. 851 (1938); Miller v.
Phoenix Assur. Co., 52 N.M. 68, 191 P.2d 993 (1948).
2. United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Northwestern National Ins. Co.. 185 F.2d 443
(10th Cir. 1950); St. Louis Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Witney, 95 F. Supp. 555
(M.D. Pa. 1951); Ind. Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Cofield, 110 Fla. 315. 148 So. 549
(1933); Bower & Kaufman v. Bothwell, 152 Md. 392, 136 Atl. 892 (1927); Carew,
Shaw & Bernasconi v. Gen. Cas. Co., 189 Wash. 329, 336, 65 P.2d 689, 692 (1937)
("One may not, by invoking the doctrine of estoppel or waiver, bring into existence
a contract not made by the parties and create a liability contrary to the express
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of breach and the time of waiver to the time of loss. Any right is a legitimate
prey to waiver or estoppel if the equities are strong enough. The equities,
in turn, depend upon the facts at the time the alleged waiver or estoppel
is asserted to have taken place. T'he most important fact of all is the
time of loss.
1IHF PRESENT CONFUSION
The application of the doctrines of waiver and estoppel by the courts
is uneven and obscure to say the least." The law of insurance is to a
considerable ex'ent a one-way street, a result of the effort by the courts
to equalize an inherent imbalance in the bargaining power of the parties
to the insurance contract. Inevitably confusion results as the courts use
the familiar rules of the common law to accomplish a purpose for which
these rules were not designed. It must be borne in mind that waiver and
estoppel as used in the insurance situation are devices to aid but one party
to the contract, the insured. But the limitations applicable to their more
general use are part and parcel of them and cannot be disregarded.
While it is true that an insurance policy is a contract, it gets special
treatment when it is construed by a court. The rule of construction that
all ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the insured is ai outgrowth
of the logical requirement that a contract be most strictly construed against
the party drafting it.4  But in insurance cases this rule of construction is
so warped, in an effort to protect the insured, that ambiguities are found
where none exist, and fictions used to aid the individual do violence to the
laws of contract and agency.6 A Florida court quite frankly not content
with resolving ambiguities of policy language in favor of the insured has
also resolved disputed facts the same way."
This solicitude for the insured is nowhere more evident than in the
use made of waiver and estoppel. The courts have been so eager to invoke
provisions of the contract the parties did make. The general rule is that. while an
insurer may be estopped, by its conduct or its knowledge or by statute, from insisting
upon a forfeiture of a policy, yet, under no conditions, can the coverage or restrictions
on the coverage be extended by the doctrine of waiver or estoppel") But see, Blumberg
v. American Fire & Casualty Co., 51 So.2d 182 (Fla. 1951 ). For a discussion concerning
this case see Kuvin, Insurance, 8 MIAMI L.Q., 340 (1954).
3. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS o INSURANCEF. LAw § 93, 418 (1st ed. 1935),
the law of waiver is so complex in its ramifications and so confused in its ideas
as well as its terminology that even the legal expert is baffled by its manifold aspects."
4. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hurni Packing Co., 263 U.S. 167 (1923); Erickson
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 126 F. Snpp. 100 (N.D. Calif. 1954); Delaney v. Rockingham
Farmer's Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 52 N.l. 581, 590 (1873) "Whether it be reliance
upon the representations of the companies' agents, or want of taste for literary pursuits
in critical esegesis. or defect of legal attainments, or press of business, or fatigue of
daily labor, or dislike of insurance typography,-whatever the cause may be, the fact is,
that, under the ordinary circumstances of the present order of things, these documents
are illegible and unintelligible to the generality of mankind .... "
5. Bowman v. Surety Fund Life Ins Co., 149 Minn. 118, 182 N.W, 991 (1921)
(An example of how far the courts will go to find implied authority to waive conditions
after the loss has already occurred.); Mears v. Farmers Co-op Fire Ins. Co., 112 Vt.
519, 28 A.2d 699 (1942) (clerk-typist working for insurer found by court to have implied
authority to waive material conditions in the policy).
6. Jefferson Standard Life Ins, Co.'v. Lyons, 122 Fla. 346. 165 So. 351 (1936).
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these doctrines that generally both arc seized upon at once and they arc
applied indiscriminately in aid of the insured; the same unfortunate act
of the insurer being termed a waiver, an estoppel, or sometimes an election,
depending upon the particular court's preference. Sometimes they arc
used interchangeably by the same court.8 Many courts, however, are aware
of the distinction and are careful to point out that waiver is the voluntary
relinquishment of a known right, and that estoppel is involuntary and
based upon reliance by the insured upon a state of facts asserted by the
insurer, estopping the latter to deny the facts assertedY We shall have
more to say about these definitions later.
One of the difficulties with waiver has been that, although it is
contractual in its essence, it lacks one principal element of contract. A
waiver need not be supported by consideration. 10 Therefore it cannot be
a substitute for contract and cannot be used to "create new rights.""
A great deal of confusion has resulted from this limitation on the power
of waiver. If a clause in a particular policy is an "exclusion" it cannot
be the subject of waiver by the reasoning of most courts, because to do
so would be to extend the risk "beyond the scope of the policy."'2  But
7. Dixon v. Standard Mutual Life Ins. Co., 206 S.C. 241, 33 S.E.2d 516 (1945);
Ellis v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins, Co. of N.Y., 187 S.C. 162, 167, 197, S.E. 510, 512
(1938)("\Vhile there are distinguishing features between waiver and estoppel, waiver
belongs to the family of estoppel, and the terms are frequently used as meaniug the
same thing in the law of contracts").
8. See Sovereign Camp v. Heflin, 59 Ga. App. 299, 200 S.E. 489 (1938); Carter
v. Old Faithful County Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 243 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Civ. App.
1951)(a contention that the insured waived the provision in a fire policy requiring
payment of premiums at the insurer's home office, and a contention that the insurer
was estopped to claim as a defense the provision requiring payment of premiums at
the home office raise essentially the same question, "there being no substantial distinc-
tion"). For general discussion see Parsons, R. & Co. v, Lane, 97 Minn. 98, 106 N.W.
485 (1906).
9. Mitchell v. Hobbs, 158 Kan. 320, 147 P.2d 721 (1944): Engstrom v. Farmers
& Bankers Life Ins. Co., 230 Minn. 308, 41 N W.2d 422 (1950); 1tarvey v. Philadelphia
Life Ins. Co., 131 S.C. 405, 127 S.E. 836 (1925); Webster v. State Mutual Fire Ins.
Co., 81 Vt. 75, 69 Atl. 319 (1908).
10. Insurance Co. v. Norton, 96 U.S. 234 (1877); Washburn v. Union Century
Life Ins. Co., 143 Ala. 485, 38 So. 1011 (1905): Engstrom v. Farmers & Bankers Life
Ins. Co.. 230 Minn. 308, 41 N.V.2d 422 (1950); Kiernan v. Dutchess Iss. Co., 150
N.Y. 190, 44 NE. 698 (1896).
11. Home Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 227 Ala. 499, 503, 150 So. 486, 489 (1933)
("Waiver or estoppel can only have a field of operation when the subject matter is
within the terms of the contract. No one, we assume, would argue that a policy of
insurance, which protected one against loss by fire, could be extended or broadened,
by application of the principle of waiver or estoppel, to cover loss by cyclone. The
effect, in such a case, would be to create a new contract without a new consideration");
Foote Lumber Co. v. Evea F. & L. Ins. Co., 179 La. 779, 155 So. 22 (1934); McCabe
v. Maryland Cas. Co., 209 N.C. 577, 183 S.E. 743 (1936).
12. The following cases have held that the "military ser-ice clause results in an
exclusion (excepted risk), and do not allow waiver: New York Life Ins. Co. v. White,
190 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1951); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Stagg, 215 Ark. 456,
221 S.V.2d 29 (1949); Miller v. Ill. Bankers Life Ass'n, 138 Ark. 442. 212 S.W.
310 (1919); Mutual Life Insurance Co. v, Davis, 79 Ga. App. 336, 53 SE.2d 571
(1949); Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. McLeod, 70 Ga. App. 181, 27 S.E.2d 871 (1943);
Railey v. United Life & Accident Ins. Co., 26 Ga. App. 269, 106 S. F. 203 (1921);
Marks v. Supreme Tribe, B. H., 191 Ky. 385, 230 S.V. 540 (1921); Ruddock v.
Detroit Life Ins. Co., 209 Mich. 638, 177 N.\\. 242 (1920); Olson v. Grand Lodge.
A. 0. U. W,, 48 N.D. 285. 184 N.W. 7 (1921): Parrino v. Prudential Ins. Co., 275
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
if the clause can be called a "condition" this difficulty is not so apparent
and the waiver can be more readily applied.' 3 In most cases the distinction
is a mere matter of terminology,'4 and yet the word used controls.
WAIVER
As we have said, waiver is generally defined as the voluntary relinquish-
ment of a known right. 15 In its "pure" state it need not be supported by
consideration nor :need it induce reliance and change of position;10 yet
once made it is irrevocable.' 7 But this definition does not help much.
Usually the voluntary promise to give up a right is not irrevocable unless
coupled with consideration. 'What kind of right then are we talking
about? Specifically it is the right of an insurer given by the express terms
of the policy or by operation of law to deny liability because of some
breach or forfeiture on the part of the insured.
For instance, the terms of the policy in a recent case' provided that
there should be no liability unless proofs of loss were filed within a
specified time. Within that period the company made an offer of settle-
ment. After the period had expired the company in effect withdrew its
offer and relied upon the insured's failure to file proofs of loss. It could
not do so. By offering settlement without a time limit it waived the 60-day
period for filing proofs of loss contained in the policy.
App. Div. 861, 89 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1949); Harrmann v. Prudential Ins. Co., 192 Misc.
758, 81 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1948); Rozdzielski v, Home Life Ins. Co., 57 Pa. D. & C.
591 (1946); Laurendeau v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 116 Vt. 183, 71 A,2d 588 (1950).
13. The following cases have construed the "military service clause" as susceptible
to waiver or estoppel: Harmon v. State Mutual Ins. Co., 202 Ca. 265, 42 S.E.2d 761
947); James v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 331 I1. App. 285, 73 N.E.2d 140 (1947);
uinones v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tenn., 209 La. 76, 24 So.2d 270 (1946);
ipson v. First Nat. Life Ins. Co., 25 So.2d 844 (La. App. 1946); Engstrom v. Farmers
& Bankers Life Ins. Co., 230 Minn. 308, 41 N.W.2d 422 (1950); Bowman v. Surety
Fund Life Ins. Co, 149 Minn. 118, 182 N.W. 991 (1921); Ellis v. Columbia Nat.
Life Ins. Co., 270 App. Div. 143, 59 N.Y.S,2d 335 (1945) aff'd without opinion 296
N.Y. 594, 68 N.E.2d 879 (1945).
14. ANDERsoN, VANCE ON INsu5RANC, § 76, 427 (3rd ed. 1951) "For example,
if the policy contains a warranted statement that the insured building is occupied,
we have an undoubted warranty. If the policy declares that 'this entire policy shall
be void if the insured building be or become vacant or unoccupied and so remain for
more than ten days,' we have just as clearly a condition. If the provision is that 'this
company shall not be liable for any loss while the insured building is vacant or
unoccupied, we have an unmistakable exception. But the policy might be worded
so as to leave the matter in doubt. Thus if the provision above given as creating an
exception should declare that the insurer should not be liable if the building became
vacant, a court might well be doubtful whether a condition or an exception was
intended."
15. See note 9 supra.
16. Draper v. Oswego County F.R. Ass'n, 190 N.Y. 12, 17, 82 N.E. 755, 756
(1907)("... it requires no consideration for a waiver, nor any prejudice or injury to
the other party"); 3 RIcHARDS, INSmsRANCE, § 434, 1456 (5th ed. 1952) "Such waiver
neither requires the support of consideration or the presence of any element of a technical
estoppel."
17. Leonhard v. Providence Say. Life Assur. Soc., 130 Fed. 287 (C.C.A. Mo. 1904);
State Life Ins. Co. v. Finney, 216 Ala, 562, 114 So. 132 (1927); Engstrom v. Farmers
& Bankers Life Ins. Co., 230 Minn. 308, 41 NW.2d 422 (1950); Roberts v. Ins. Co.
of America, 94 Mo. App. 142, 72 S.W. 144 (1902).
18. City of Pittsburgh v. Firemen's Ins. Co. of Newark, 366 Pa. 49, 76 A.2d
368 (1950).
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However, it is generally held that a waiver may not be used to extend
the scope of the policy.19 But any waiver does, in fact, do just that. If it
be held that the company has given up its right to declare the policy
void because the insured has failed to file proofs of loss within the time
required, the policy now contains one less right belonging to the company,
and one more right granted to the insured. And if such waiver is irrevocable
a different contract has been created without consideration.
What then do the courts mean by "extending the scope of the policy"?
Well, certainly if a policy of fire insurance specifically covers building
A and the fire occurs in building B, the most express waiver would not be
held to bind the company to pay the loss on building B. The right not
to pay on building B exists independent of the policy and most courts
would hold that this right can only be given up by an agreement with
consideration. Such a waiver would be said to extend the scope of the
policy with a vengeance and would undoubtedly not be enforced. But
as both waivers in our hypotheticals do extend the scope of the policy
to a degree, a limitation based upon the nature of the waiver common to
both is devoid of meaning. A better limitation would depend upon the
equities present at the time the waiver occurs.
None the less, waiver must be defined if we are to discuss it intelli-
gently. Let us define it therefor as the voluntary relinquishment of a
known defence affirmatively given by the terms of the contract, or of a
known forfeiture arising by operation of law.
ESTOPPEL
Estoppel, although frequently arising out of the same facts as waiver,
is quite a different affair. It is essentially involuntary. It is a denial of
a right by operation of law and is grounded in an innate sense of equity
which forbids the assertion of the right because to allow it would be
unjust, one party having changed position to his detriment in reliance
upon the activity of the party estopped.20
Where a waiver is express, or at least known to the insured, his
continued reliance upon the insurer's treating the policy as still in force
may give rise to an estoppel, and thus the courts may be forgiven in many
instances for confusing the two terms. But in the estoppel situation the
equities are stronger in favor of the insured than in the case of a simple
waiver.
19. See notes 2 and 11 supra.
20. See Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Hudgcns, 229 Ala. 552, 555, 158
So. 757, 758 (1935) ("Where a man, by his words or conduct, wilfully or by negligence
causes another to believe in the existence of a certain state of things, and induces him
to act on that belief, so as to alter his own previous position, the former is concluded
from denying the existence of that state of facts").
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The language of the courts would imply that an estoppel is subject
to the same limitation as is a waiver? 1 Estoppel, like waiver, may not
be used to extend the policy or create contractual rights. But where an
estoppel is present there certainly are strong equities in favor of forbidding
the insurer the right to deny liability even though the loss sought to be
recovered was expressly excluded from the contract, or was not covered
by its terms. Some courts have allowed recovery in such situations.22
It is submitted that if estoppel be deemed sufficient to enforce a gratuitous
oral promise to make a gift of land,23 it should be equally efficacious on
behalf of an insured where the equities are the same.
THE TIME OF Loss
The illusory boundaries of waiver and estoppel as we have said, are
still being used to guide the courts deeper into confusion. XVe suggest
that a more helpful guide as to the application of these doctrines is to be
found in the relationship of the time of breach and waiver to the time
of loss. Once a loss has occurred within the scope of the policy, as it exists
at that time, certain changes take place in the legal and equitable relation-
ships of the parties that should provide a more certain and more just
application of the doctrines here considered.
At the inception of the contract of insurance and throughout its
duration, prior to loss, the relationship of the parties is a confidential one
which burdens both insured and insurer. It exists even before the policy
is entered into. The insured owes the duty of uberrinha fides and the
insurer by virtue of his superior knowledge and compartively vast resources,
likewise owes the duty of utmost good faith towards the insured. 24  But
once loss has occurred that relationship is ended, at least with regard
to the risk itself. The parties are now either debtor and creditor or
they are not, and the rcasons for applying equitable doctrines in considering
the effect of acts which took place prior to loss are, or should be, subject
to complete re-appraisal. To attempt to apply the test of whether or not
a waiver or estoppel would broaden the scope of the policy and to ignore
the relationship of the parties to each other and the duties each owes to
each can only result in adding to the mounting mass of confusion.
21. See Ruddock v. Detroit Life Ins. Co., 209 Mich. 638, 177 N.V. 242 (1920);
McCoy v. Northwestern Mutual Benefit Ass'n, 92 Wis. 577, 66 N.V. 697 (1896).
But see Gerka v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 251 N.Y. 511, 167 N.E. 169 (1929); Draper
v. Oswego County Fire Relief Ass'n, 190 N.Y. 12, 82 N.E. 755 (1907)(The New
York Court of Appeals held that an insurance company 'nay estop itself from denying
that an excepted cause is not covered by the policy).
22. See Sovereign Camrip v. Richardson, 151 Ark. 231, 236 S.\V. 278 (1921);
Gerka v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 251 N.Y. 511, 167 N.E, 169 (1929); Draper v. Oswego
County Fire Relief Ass'n, 190 N.Y. 12, 82 N.E. 755 (1907).
23. Invin v. Dyke, 114 Ill. 302, 1 N.E. 913 (1885); Seavey v. Drake. 62 N.H.
393 (1882).
24. Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Powell, 160 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 19471;
Rishel v, Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 78 F.2d 881 (10th Cir. 1937). See also Comment,
48 YALE L.I. 839 (1939).
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BREACH AND WAIVER OR ESTOPPEL
BOMT BEFORE Loss
In Soverign Camp v. Richardson25 a declaration made at the inception
of the policy by the agent of the insurer that a military exclusion clause
would not be enforced was held to estop the insurer from relying on the
clause after loss. This decision has caused certain commentators regret. 26
The decision is criticized on the ground that to permit parole evidence
of the "preliminary parole agreement" is a violation of the parole evidence
rule and that such may not be done under the guise of waiver or even
estoppel. But it is submitted that this "preliminary parole agreement,"
if made by the agent knowing it to be unenforceable, or made recklessly,
is certainly a breach of the confidential relationship existing at that crucial
time, and that the parole evidence rule was never intended to apply to
such a situation. The parole evidence rule was designed to prevent fraud,
not to implement it,2 T The real difficulty with this case is that it refuses
to conform to the idea that estoppel cannot be used to extend the scope
of the contract.
But as we have seen, every estoppel does, to some extent, extend the
contract's scope, and to refuse to use this equitable doctrine in this instance
could logically result in abolishing the doctrine itself. The important question
to decide is not whether the waiver or estoppel extends the contract, but
whether the equities involved are strong enough to justify invoking the
doctrine. Here the misleading actions of insurer's agent occurred before
loss and at a time when the insured was most in need of the utmost good
faith on the part of the company. The act of the agent was a waiver,
but it was also an estoppel in that there was reliance on the waiver and
a change of position, i.e., insured could have obtained a policy giving him
express coverage. Whenever a waiver occurs before loss there is great
likelihood of reliance by the insured. The company invites reliance, and
25. 151 Ark. 231, 236 S.W. 278 (1921).
26. ANDERSON, VANCE ON INSURANCE, § 82, 485 (3d ed. 1951).
27. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 13 Wall 222 (U.S. 1872); Comment,
47 HARv. L. REv. 1010 (1934). "In the existing state of the law the parole evidence
rule, strictly or liberally applied, does perform a necessary function in preventing fraud
or mere inaccuracies of memory from introducing an undesirable degree of uncertainty
into insurance contract relations. But the theoretical justification of the rule, based
upon the 'integration' of prior negotiations into the final agreement, while applicable
to ordinary contracts, is here quite unrealistic. In the commoner forms of insurance
the assured accepts a policy which, being completely standardized except for a few
options which are themselves standardized, is in many respects a commodity rather
than a contract. The acceptance is ordinarily accompanied by only the vaguest
knowledge of the policy's contents. Furthermore, although the formation of other
kinds of contracts embodying such complicated terms and phraseology, both parties
would normally participate by their attorneys, that is probably seldom done in this
situation . . ." But see, American Potato Co. v. Genette Bros., 172 N.C. 1, 3, 89
S.E. 791, 792 (1916)('Fhe rules of law are and must needs be universal in their
application, this being essential to certainty in business transactions and to the integrity
of contracts; for otherwise 'commerce may degenerate into chicanery, and trade become
another name for trick'").
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therefor there should be little hesitancy by the courts in holding the
company to the implications of its actions.
Likewise a waiver may also be more justifiably found before loss,
because as a practical matter most waivers include the unstated intention
of the company to keep the policy in force so that more premiums will
be paid. For instance, if the agent of the company knows that the insured
is unwittingly violating a condition of the policy and does not inform
him, but continues to take the premiums, the agent is attempting to
better the company at the insured's expense, and even though there is
no reliance upon the waiver because the insured did not know of it,
the company should be bound. If a reluctant insured may be kept as a
paying policyholder by a waiver of prompt payment of premium, most
salesmen would applaud the waiver. To allow the insurer to defend on
the very acts that it initiated for its own benefit would be most unjust.
Generally the finding of a waiver or estoppel before loss has presented
no difficulties to the courts. The reasoning is frequently faulty in that
exclusions are called conditions in many cases, and fictions are employed. 2
But on a proper set of facts a waiver or estoppel aids the insured, as it
should. However, a clear understanding of the reasons for applying the
doctrines would simplify the problem.
WAIVER OR ESTOPPEL AFTER Loss
When the alleged waiver or estoppel arises after loss an entirely
different approach is indicated. Here we no longer have a trusting insured
looking to a protecting companly to indemnify him should a certain event
occur. Instead we have an insured who either has or has not a right to
receive payment from a concern which no longer has the pleasant prospect
of premiums coining in. Now, the company is faced with payment of a
loss which was expected on the basis of its experience and should be
limited to the actual undertaking at the time of loss.
Two fact situations can arise when the waiver or estoppel arises
after loss:
1. The breach or forfeiture by the insured occurred after loss.
2. The breach or forfeiture occurred before loss.
For the reasons hereinafter stated we feel that the doctrines of waiver
or estoppel should be applied with modification in the first case and not
at all in the second.
BREACH AND WAIVER OR ESTOPPEL Bori
OCCURRING AFTER Loss
The happening of the loss terminates the confidential aspect of the
relation of insurer-insured with regard to the scope of the risk. The
28. See notes 12 and 13 supra.
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particular risk insured against must be limited to what it was at that time.
After loss no risk exists. But although there may or may not be a debtor-
creditor relationship after loss, depending upon the facts, certainly some
sort of relationship does exist. It is based upon the interest of both
parties in settling the claim. Here, without question a waiver or estoppel
may arise against either party, but it should not affect the fundamental
rights of either under the policy which have already been determined by
the circumstances of the loss. It should be limited to the settlement
of the debtor-creditor relationship. Thus the insurer may waive failure
to file proof of loss29 or any other obligation of the insured which arises
after loss.3O
But even as to matters concerned with the winding up of the insurance
contract there can be no waiver or estoppel unless the acts relied upon
to invoke the doctrines occurred before the breach. A recent Massachusetts
case' " states this principle well. After loss the insured failed to file proofs
of loss within the period of sixty days as required by the policy. Some
two months later the company advised the insured that it denied liability
on another ground, namely that the property lost was not the property
insured. The trial court found for the insured. The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, speaking through Justice Spalding said, "It is
established law that the failure to file the required proofs of loss within
the time limited bars recovery unless the failure is excused or has been
waived . . . . it is also the law that a denial of liability by an insurance
company not predicated on the failure to furnish proofs is a waiver of
any objection on that ground . . . . Evidently the trial judge relying on
this principle concluded that the letter of April 29 constituted a waiver.
But this rule is subject to the qualification that the denial of liability on
other grounds must occur within the period allowed for filing proofs of
loss . . . . where the denial of liability takes place after the expiration of
the period for filing proofs, it cannot be said that the assured has been
induced to forego steps to prevent a default under the policy, for the
default has already occurred." (Italics supplied).
BREACH OR FOIFEITURE OCCURIuNG BEFORE Loss
WAIVER OR ESTOPPEL OCCURRING AFTER Loss
Where, by the terms of the contract or because of the insured's fraud
or misrepresentation the insurer at the time of loss is under no liability to
pay the claim and it has not waived the forfeiture or breach and has had
no knowledge of it which could result in an estoppel, the rights of the
parties are fixed by the happening of the loss.
29. Fidelity-IPhenix Fire Ins- Co. v. Berry, 81 Ga. App. 209, 58 S.E.2d -192 (1950);
Reynolds v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 117 Vt. 541, 97 A.2d 121 (1953).
30. Runner v. Colvert Fire Ins. Co., 76 S.E.2d 244 (V.Va. 1953).
31. Milton Ice Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 320 Mass. 719, 720, 71 N.E.2d
232, 233 (1947).
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Let us assume that a combination automobile policy contains the
following language:
This policy does not apply while the automobile is used as a
public livery conveyance unless such use is specifically declared
and described in this policy and premium charged therefor.3 2
The insured is using the automobile in violation of the terms of this clause
at the time of the accident. The insurer has not, prior to loss, had notice
of this use. Clearly, at the moment of loss there is no liability on the
part of the insurer. The policy is mature; the loss has occurred and there
is no coverage.
Can a recovery be allowed on the basis of acts by the insurer subsequent
to loss on the grounds of waiver or estoppel? Many courts have answered
in the affirmative. '  They do so by finding that this clause is a "condition"
and not an "exclusion," and that therefore a waiver or estoppel will not
extend the scope of the policy. Other courts have denied a recovery on
similar facts because a waiver or estoppel of an "exclusion" would extend
the policy's scope. 4 But as we have said, all waivers or estoppels do extend
the contract and therefore the limitation is meaningless. We would deny
recovery on these facts, but for different reasons.
To create a liability after loss where none existed at the time of loss
is an attempt to make an insurance contract retroactive and, with the
exception of the "lost or not lost" clause in marine contracts, this has
been considered to render the policy void as being in violation of sound
public policy. Mallard v. Hardware Indemnity Ins. Co. of Minnesota5
dealt with a situation in which there was no coverage at the time of loss.
The company, however, subsequent to loss treated the policy as in force,
required proofs of loss, and even held premiums tip to the time of trial.
But the court in denying recovery quoted from Alliance Insurance Co. v.
Continental Gin Co.,"" " 'Property in esse (with exceptions immaterial
here) is the basis of a contract of or for fire insurance. A substantial element
is the chance of loss. If either thing be absent (i.e., if there be no
property originally or chance of loss be precluded by the certainty incident
to pre-occurring fire), the insurance company is in the absurd position of
freely offering to pay a large and certain sum . - . if the insured will pay
to it the comparatively insignificant amount of the premium .... The
32. Specimen Combination Automobile Policy prepared by Association of Casualty
Insurance Companies, Institute of Life Insurance and National Board of Fire Under-
writers, in consultation with American Association of University Teachers of Insurance.
33. Mattson v. Conn. Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 80 F. Stpp. 101 (I).Minn. 1949);
Faarmers Union Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wyman, 251 Ark. 1, 251 S.W.2d 819 (1953);
Bowman v. Surety Fund Life Ins. Co., 149 Minn. 118, 182 NA. 991 (1921).
34. Pothier v. New Ansterdam Cas. Co., 192 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1951); Union
Marine and General Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 249 Ala. 294, 31 So.2d 303 (1947); Booker
v. Motor Ins, Co., 228 S.W.2d 694 (Springfield Ct. of Appeals, Mo. 1950).
35. 216 S.W.2d 263, 266 (Ct. of Civ. App. Tex. 1948).
36. 285 S.W. 257, 258 (Tex. Coin. App. 1926).
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business of fire insurance has acquired quasi public aspects. Rate regulation
has proceeded to the point where improper payment of losses substantially
affects the well-nigh common burden. And, because of these things, it is
our opinion that the public policy would inhibit the making or enforcement
of an insurance contract in relation to imaginary property, even where
both parties so intend.
"'A fortiori, ratification (rather, adoption) after destruction of the
property of that which before disaster was not a contract of or for insurance
is an attempt to do by indirection that which cannot be directly done.'
"One of the bases for the holdings above set out is that of public
policy. It follows that no contract contrary to public policy can be
enforced by way of estoppel."
If the company in our hypothetical case, on learning of the circum-
stances of the accident, should promise nevertheless to assume liability,
such a promise should be unenforceable even if coupled with consideration.
However, let us say that the company adjuster, having knowledge of
the circumstances which negative liability, none the less takes the car to
a garage and obtains estimates of the cost of repair. This is inconvenient
to the insured and delays repair of the automobile causing him to lose
several days' use of it. Does the reliance of the insured, at this point,
upon the company's treating the loss as covered give rise to an estoppel
which will bind the company? Many courts have held that it does, but
others have held that it does not.3 7
It scems obvious that any estoppel claimed to arise by acts of the
company after loss cannot be said to have induced any reliance by the
insured prior to loss. Therefore, the insured could not have changed his
position in regard to the risk and the company should be allowed to defend
as to the terms and conditions of risk. True the insurer may be estopped
to demand proofs of loss and similar matters, but these do not relate to
the risk, only to the settlement, as discussed above.
CONCLUSION
It is not to be expected that the ideas herein expressed will make
application of the doctrines of waiver and estoppel a mere matter of fitting
the facts to the form. We have not considered the impact of the law of
agency on our fact situations and in many cases it might control.," 'I'hcse
views are put forth primarily in the hope that the underlying equitics
present in the insurance situation may be considered in a realistic light and
that the catch phrase, waiver and estop pel cannot be used to extend the
scope of the policy, be someday relegated to the limbo where it belongs.
37. See notes 33 and 34 supra.
38. PATTEMRSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAw, §92, 413 (1st ed. 1935) "'The
law of agency permeates the law of the insurance contract like a thick London fog.
One can find one's way about in this fog if one moves slowly, but cannot rely upon
the maps and guides that lawyers have provided in the general doctrines of agency law."
